Effects of moral intensity and self-evaluation on ethical propensity: A cross-level analysis. by Fung, Helen (yee Shou).
1UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE
EFFECTS OF MORAL INTENSITY AND SELF-EVALUATION ON ETHICAL 
PROPENSITY: A CROSS LEVEL ANALYSIS
A Dissertation 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
By 
Helen (Yee Shou) Fung
Norman, Oklahoma
2004
 
 
 
UMI Number:  3138518
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________ 
UMI Microform  3138518
Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved.  This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
PO Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 
2EFFECTS OF MORAL INTENSITY AND SELF-EVALUATION ON ETHICAL 
PROPENSITY: A CROSS LEVEL ANALYSIS
A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
BY 
____________________
Michael R. Buckley
____________________
Jorge L. Mendoza
____________________
Ryan Brown
____________________
Michael Harvey
____________________
Michael Mumford
3© Copyright by HELEN (YEE SHOU) FUNG 2004
All Rights Reserved.
4ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thank you GOD for embracing me throughout this project, I cannot express a 
greater joy for the spiritual growth and faith that I have experienced as a result of this 
dissertation. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my graduate committee for 
their constructive input and guidance: Dr. Michael Buckley, Dr. Jorge Mendoza, Dr. 
Ryan Brown, Dr. Michael Harvey, and Dr. Michael Mumford. An extra note of gratitude 
goes to Dr. Michael Buckley for being an exceptional committee chair by devoting his 
academic skills, talents, resources, and patience in developing this research project, data-
collection, and giving persistent encouragement to me to complete this project. Thank 
you to the great faculty, staff, and students at the University of Oklahoma, with whom I 
was fortunate to work and learn.
Millions of thank yous to my parents, Mr. Fung Him Hing and Ms. Maggie Tsui, 
and my sisters, Jo and Amy, for their unfailing support. My graduate career was a true 
family project that was coordinated between 3 countries. Heartfelt thanks to my friends 
who shared in my despair and joy: Michelle Abraham, Justin Bearden, Juan and Teri 
Benavidez , Dr. Monika Cogoini and Dr. Bodo Katz, Sherry Cox, April Dobbs,  Jan 
Durbin, Brian Friel, Lisa Harvison, Tracy Henning, Irish Hookano, Wallace Kaserer, 
Todd Kosmerick , Barbara Lamb, Jean-Michele Lamoine, Dr. Bob Mooneyham, Dr. 
Milorad Novicevic, Dr. Diana Padro, Rosemary Schultz , Dr. Barbara Smallwood, Dr. 
Herb Spencer, Mary Treaftis, Ka Ki Tsui , Nancy Tung and Bob Connolly, Etta Walden, 
Dr. Catherine Webb, Connie Wong, Dr. Grady Wray and Herman Carrillo,  and Judy and 
John Van Door.
5TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE START
Table of Content V
Chapter One Introduction 1
Chapter Two Literature Review 5
Chapter Three Methodology 18
Chapter Four Results 23
Chapter Five Discussion 54
Literature References 63
Appendix 71
6CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
A question that has piqued the curiosity of many businesspersons is concerned with the 
behavioral motivation of employees and managers.  For example, why do employees and/or 
managers make the decisions that they make?  Answering this question has enormous 
implications for shaping and predicting the behaviors of different organizational members 
(employees, managers) at work. Unfortunately, individuals sometimes fail to make ethically 
sound decisions and the primary focus of this research concerns ethically unsound decisions 
are made. This study is an empirical examination gauging the impact of different levels of 
moral intensity on the self-reported propensity to engage in an unethical behavior.
Business Ethics in Transition: Why?
Varieties of corporate scandals (primarily due to the occurrence of unethical decisions) 
have dominated recent media coverage and have had disastrous consequences for numerous 
organizations as well as organizational members. It seems as though these unethical decisions
are exposed, investigated and reported in the mass media on a regular basis. Recent examples 
cover a wide range of behaviors and include the Enron scandal, Parmalat executives falsified 
financial statements (Italy’s Enron: Does Wall Street Share Parmalat’s Blame?, March 2004), 
financial institutions assisting clients in designing questionable financial structures (CIBC 
Pays $80m to settle Enron, December 23, 2003), government leaders’ refusal to participate in 
Koyoto Protocol (Europe Backs Kyoto Accord, March 31, 2001), and a firefighter set off a 
multiple states forest fire (New York Times, July 23, 2002, A7). Some would argue that the 
United States is facing an ethical crisis as President Bush has exclaimed the need for stricter 
laws to reinforce ethics standards in business (Bush Speech on Business Fraud Signals a Shift, 
7July 10, 2002). However, some might object to the exclusive dependency on explicit contacts 
and social obligations to restrain or punish individuals from engaging in unethical actions 
(Bowie & Freeman, 2001).
The consequences of aforementioned ethical misdeeds illustrate the implications and 
contingencies of ethical decision-making have on the miscreants themselves, their 
organizations, as well as business and society as a whole. How do people resolve the tension 
between abide to legal constraints and attaining ethically questionable goals? 
It could be concluded that the preceding examples were clearly negative to the 
perpetrators (criminal charges), their organizations (bankruptcy and penalty), to their 
stakeholders (loss of stock value) and their community (job loss and environmental damages). 
However, perpetrators in each of the preceding cases engaged in various forms of 
questionable decision-making as they were motivated by immediate positive outcomes at the 
personal level (personal wealth and job security), organizational level (increasing 
organizational stock value and organizational competitive advantages), as well as societal 
level (employment and economic growth). According to the teleological perspective, the 
ethical nature of an act is consequentially dependent such that the overall gain or loss 
determines the right or wrong of that action (Lefkowitz, 2003). However, the deontological 
ethics perspective advocated the ethical nature of an action is determined by the act itself and 
whether it abides to culturally embraced moral principles and laws---ethics should be 
evaluated independent of outcomes (Lefkowitz, 2003). Recently, May and Pauli (2002) 
empirically examined and reported the presence of both teleological and deontological ethics 
perspective in moral evaluation. Hence, it is necessary to integrate both deontological and 
teleological evaluations in an ethical decision-making model, as both perspectives provide 
8insights as to why and when decisions conform to social and legal parameters in a given 
situation for a particular environmental context.
Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent ethical decision-making model emphasized both the 
characteristics of the ethical issue, moral intensity, and the individual’s evaluation of the issue 
were determinates of the subsequent ethical intention and behavior. This decision-making 
model generated a number of empirical studies that examined the different stages of the model 
(Duberich, Waller, George, & Huber, 2000; Frey, 2000; Harrington, 1997; Marshall & Dewe, 
1997; May & Pauli, 2003; Singer & Singer, 1997). Jones (1991) argued that the different 
characteristics of an ethical issue should influence an individuals’ ethical judgment of the 
issue, their intention, and subsequent decision. The following chapter will briefly review the 
issue-contingent ethical decision-making model and social perception and its relevance to 
ethical decision-making.
Scores of studies has examined the influences of moral intensity with the teleological 
and deontological ethical evaluation, but no conclusive findings regarding the relationship 
between contextual characteristics with the two ethical evaluations were established (May & 
Pauli, 2002; Pauli & May, 2002; Singer & Singer, 1997). These previous studies focused on 
the moral issues and its influence on moral recognition, evaluation, and intention, relative 
little attention has been given to the relevance of social perception bias during different stages 
of ethical decision-making (Harrington, 1997). Individuals often would have a self-enhancing 
tendency when outcome implications were relevant to their self-concept in areas such as 
grades, teamwork performance, and interpersonal skills (Brown, 1986; Krueger, 1998; 
Paulhus & John, 1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
9Self-enhancing bias in evaluating self-ethicality was found in Manley, Russell, & 
Buckley (2001) where undergraduate business students perceived others having a lower level 
of ethical propensity in comparison to themselves under identical circumstances. Implications 
remained unanswered regarding the relationship with the self-enhancing bias with different 
outcome implications and contingencies of decisions with decision-maker’s subsequent 
ethical propensity. 
Therefore, the primary objective of the study is to examine whether an individual’s 
ethical propensity changes as the magnitude and scope of beneficial consequences is 
manipulated from a low level of magnitude (self-gain) to a higher level of magnitude 
(organizational-gain and societal-gain). A second objective is to examine whether outcomes 
of unethical actions in combination with social perception bias would influence the extents of 
decision-makers’ self-perceived unethical propensity in comparison to their perceptions of 
other’s unethical propensity. A third objective is to understand whether teleological and 
deontological ethical evaluation is related to self-evaluation bias in decision-making. Further, 
this dissertation will also empirically determine the contingencies of ethical decision-making, 
a.k.a. accountability, with ethical propensity. This supplemental objective was to determine a 
level of accountability that might serve as deterrence to an individual and will potentially 
dissuade individuals from engaging in unethical decisions/actions. 
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
Moral Intensity: Magnitude of Consequences and Concentration of Effects
Jones (1991) proposed a multidimensional ethical decision-making model; however, 
this study only examined the relationship between moral intensity and social perception with 
moral evaluation (See Jones 1991 for the complete model). Jones proposed 6 dimensions of an 
ethical issue that might influence ethical decision-making in organizations. The six moral 
intensity dimensions were: a) magnitude of consequences – the sum of harm/benefits as the 
result of the decision itself; b) social consensus – the degree to which a social norm and 
standard regarding the ethical nature of the decision; c) probability of effects – the joint 
probability of the action will actually occur and its predicted harmful/beneficial consequences; 
d) temporal immediacy – the time lapse between the decision and the occurrence of its 
consequences; e) proximity – the physical and psychological distance between the decision 
maker and the victims/beneficiaries; and f) the concentration of effects – the number of people 
affected by the decision.
The current study is concerned with the magnitude effect of positive consequences and 
concentration of effects on individuals’ ethical propensity. Singer and Singer (1997) reported 
individuals judged a questionable act that resulted in beneficial outcomes as less unethical, 
and their ethical evaluation was predicted on: 1) social consensus; 2) magnitude of 
consequences; and 3) probability of effect. Past studies have used scenarios or vignettes to 
depict a questionable act with detailed negative consequences to arouse respondents’ ethical 
awareness and elicited their ethical intention (i.e., Butterfield, Trevino, & Weaver, 2000). 
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 Indeed, magnitude of consequences should predict the perceived ethical nature of an act 
that resulted in harmful consequences. However, the aforementioned perpetrators engaged in 
the unethical acts were believed to be motivated by the beneficial outcomes, rather than the 
destructive consequences. Therefore, this study will examine the effect of predicted beneficial 
outcomes with two levels of magnitude of consequences (high or low) and three levels of 
outcome concentration (self, organization, and society) on a person’s self-perceived ethical 
propensity. 
Studies such as Bersoff (2001), Vardi, and Weitz (2004) identified three types of 
outcome that motivate organizational members to engage in unethical behavior: 1) benefit to 
the self; 2) benefit to the organization; and 3) harmful to specific targeted individuals or 
organizations. The current study focuses on the first two types of outcome, but it also 
incorporates a third type of motivation for unethical propensity – outcomes that benefit 
society. However, individuals that engage in unethical behavior for gains other than their own 
interest might contradict classical economic/rational predictions of human behavior. 
According to classical economic-rational heuristics, individuals pursued self-interest for 
survival.  This is a universal feature of human behavior. The ethical nature of an action is 
evaluated solely based on the degree to which the actor acquires benefits, which suggests that 
an extreme form of teleological evaluation. Therefore, ethical egoism would be the dominant 
form of ethical evaluation in different decision-making contexts (Bowie, 2001)
Although some economists (i.e., Yang, 1996; Chin, 1989) embraced Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” concept and insisted on the advantage of economic rational heuristics in 
predicting decision-making for social and economic development, they have not ignored the 
importance of including deontological ethical judgment human decision-making. These 
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authors did agree that being egoistical did not necessary imply being destructive to others. 
Egoism, according to philosophical analyses, was motivated by a combination of self-directed 
motivations to improve one’s condition, but not purposely sabotaging others’ gain (Sober, 
1989). Therefore, in order for a society to maintain its order while its members are behaving 
egoistically (i.e., striving for self-gain) an intact and effective legal and social system was 
absolutely necessary to govern behavior and protect its members from others’ destructive 
actions (Yang, 1996, Chin, 1989). China is experiencing unprecedented economic growth 
resulting in annual growth of 10 percent a year but  is lacking an effective legal system to 
regulate its members from engaging in various counterfeiting and other intellectual piracy 
activities that will have long term devastating consequences to its social, economic, and 
international development (Yang, 1996). In sum, the classical economic-rational theory is not 
adequate in describing and predicting human behavior, instead ethical considerations that 
includes contextual constraints and individual differences must be integrated in order to better 
understand human decision-making (Bowie, 2001).
Bowie (2001) and Miller (2001) argued traditional economic teaching of human 
behavior presents a powerful but simplistic view on human behavior. However, the 
aforementioned economic analyses and empirical prisoner dilemma-type studies (i.e., Guth, 
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1987; Hu & Liu, 2003) did not fully support classical economic 
predictions of decision-making. In addition to the rational economist’s perspective on 
egoistical ethical decision-making, investigating the presence of both forms of teleological 
and deontological ethical evaluations were necessary in understanding ethical decision-
making evaluation.  
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As business complexity has increased dramatically with globalization, organizational 
members are under constant pressure to make decisions that can maximize not only their own 
personal gain, but also benefiting the organization as well as the society in which their 
organization is headquartered but have divergent legal ideals as well as systems. 
Hypothetically, organizational members’ teleological form of ethical evaluation might exceed 
the deontological reasoning in a morally intensive situation; the teleological oriented decision 
might prevail with salient negative consequences, especially when legal rules were violated.  
Therefore, a close examination of decision-makers’ unethical propensity concerns outcomes 
across different levels of magnitude and levels of concentration should yield some insight into
the coexistence of the theological and deontological forms of business ethics in practice.
Social Perceptions and Biases on Ethical Evaluation
Organizational members rarely work completely independent or free from any form of 
monitoring or governance. Vardi and Weitz (2004) summarized an on-site organizational field 
study and concluded an effective reward and accountability system was a key in developing 
an ethical organizational culture that effectively discourages unethical organizational 
behavior. Trevino, Butterfield, and McCabe’s (1998) survey of organizational unethical 
conduct also found a significant (negative) relationship between ethical organizational culture 
with perceived unethical conduct across two samples ( r1=-.53 and r2=-.58). Furthermore, 
Trevino et al. also found a positive relationship between an individual-oriented organizational 
climate with perceived unethical conducts (r1=.38 and r2=.49). However, Ford and Richardson 
(1994) reported a positive discrepancy between self-perceptions of ethical nature in
comparison to the perception of others in a numbers of organizational ethical decision-making 
studies. Although Ford and Robinson did not offer plausible explanations for the discrepancy 
14
between self and others perception of the ethical nature of an individual, Jones (1991) 
suggested cognitive biases might influence ethical awareness and evaluation. 
Negative consequences of holding a distorted self-perception included an increase in 
unethical propensity, disregarding others’ position and underestimated negative consequences 
from one’s actions on themselves, their organizations and the society as a whole (Maxwell & 
Ames, 1981; Mesick & Bazerman, 2001). Payne and Giacalone (1999) have opined that 
social-cognitive psychology could contribute greatly to the study of business ethics because 
individuals constituted an organization that was then embedded within a larger social system. 
They argued that social cognitive perception should be incorporated into understanding how 
individuals would perceive their own ethics under different circumstances. Past studies have 
examined individual differences (i.e., role orientation and denial of responsibility) in ethical 
evaluation, but the examination of the effect of social perception in one’s ethical evaluation 
has been largely ignored (Harrington, 1997).
Social Perception: Self-Evaluation Biases
Harvey and Weary (1985) summarized different aspects of social cognitive biases and 
their relevance to business ethics. An example of biased judgment was Messick and 
Bazerman’s (1996) examination of manufacturers’ reliance on cognitive heuristic that 
underestimated the odds of birth defects related to using their products. Attribution is a form 
of biased inferential reasoning that individuals use to assign responsibilities/causality to 
consequences. The fundamental attribution error is an example of a form of self-serving 
perception bias that the actor and the observer would interpret the same action differently 
(Reeder, 1982; Harvey & McGlynn, 1982). An observer is likely to justify his/her own actions 
with external contextual influences but ignores the situational influences while judging the 
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same action displayed by another person. The observer would likely to make internal 
attributions about the actor’s character and personality that corresponded to the observed 
actions. An alternative form of the fundamental attribution error is the self-enhancement bias 
that suggested evaluation bias might obscure one from having a realistic self-perception 
(Paulhus, 1998; Taylor and Brown, 1988). 
Self-evaluation biases, notably the self-enhancement bias, are the tendency that people 
would favorably distort their evaluation of themselves relative to others. It is a form of self-
protective mechanism that preserves and maintains one’s self-image in a positive light 
(Robins, 2001; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). 
Taylor and Brown (1988) reported participants rated positive traits as being more descriptive 
of themselves and negative traits were lesser accurate in describing themselves.
Recently Paulhus and John (1998) proposed that individuals engage in unconscious 
positive self-distortions and suggested two distinct self- deception styles as basic self defense 
mechanisms. The natures of these two types of self-deceptive style were categorized as being 
egoistical and moralistic. The egoistic deceptive biases manifested through traits such as need 
for power, self-deceptive enhancement, self-promoter, achievement, competence, dominance. 
The above constellations of competency and achievement oriented self-regarding bias were 
collectively labeled as the Alpha bias. Moralistic deceptive bias associated with relationship-
oriented traits such as need for approval, social-acceptance, need for affiliation, nurturing, and 
collectivism. These aforementioned self-driven biases were collectively labeled as the Gamma 
bias. Paulhus and John’s (1998) factor analyzed a collection of values, motives, personality 
traits, self-evaluation measures; a two-factor solution emerged and the two factors were 
labeled as the Alpha bias and the Gamma bias. Gamma biases of self-evaluation are relevant 
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to current investigation of different moral intensity levels might affect self-perceived ethical 
propensity. Discussions of both Alpha and Gamma biases provide some insight into the issue 
of ethical decision-making.
Narcissistic, extraversion, and openness of the Big Five Personality Traits collectively 
characterized the Alpha bias, such that individuals tended to over-estimate their competencies 
and accomplishment such as their intelligence, academic grades, and task performance in 
comparison to objective performance criteria or others’ ratings (John & Robins, 1994; 
Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998). Recently, Robins and Beer 
(2001) conducted a longitudinal study to examine the long-term effects of self-enhancement 
bias. They reported negative to null relationships between university freshmen’ self-
enhancement bias with their later levels of self-esteem, academic engagement, academic 
performance, and graduation rates. Individuals also exhibited the self-enhancing bias in their 
self-ratings on different types of task behavior. For example, drivers reported that other 
drivers had a lower level of consideration and drove at a higher speed than they did (Walton, 
1998; 1999). Pfeffer, Cialdino, Hanna, and Knopoft (1998) found MBA participants attributed 
a higher level of quality to a task when they had actively participated in and supervised—
where they were most involved in the process of task completion. Negative behavioral 
implications of self-enhancement bias or the Alpha bias could be predicted from preceding 
studies that drivers might engage in reckless driving to defend themselves against the ‘other’ 
reckless drivers and managers might be unwilling to empower subordinates with autonomy 
because of their positive bias in appraising outcomes in which they had personally 
participated. 
17
Another form of self-evaluation bias is the Gamma bias. Pro-social tendencies 
characterized the Gamma bias such that the Gamma Biased individuals tended to see 
themselves as the ‘law abiding citizens’ who conform and abide to social norms. Gamma Bias 
characteristic also positively correlated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness of the Big 
Five Personality Traits (Paulhus & John, 1994;Robins & Paulhus, 2001). Paulhus and John 
(1998) suggested the Gamma biased individuals were likely to perceive themselves to be more 
ethical than other people are; this illusion of being more moralistic is a different form of 
biased self-perception than the Alphas bias. Morgan (1993) reported that managers’ self-
rating of their ethical nature was higher than the ratings obtained from their subordinates and 
peers. Bowie (2001) also reported an earlier study (Maxwell and Ames, 1981) that found 
executive tended to perceive other executives as being less ethical and justified their own 
unethical behavior as self-protective maneuvers. What is needed is a closer examination of the 
effects of Gamma biases in ethical evaluation under different levels of moral intensity. 
Gamma biased individuals’ had a positive and inflated self-perception of their ethical 
nature, which was a means to maintain their pro-social and communal self-image. Therefore, 
these individuals should be more likely to engage in unethical behavior to achieve a greater 
gain for the common goods than for their own benefit. It might be reasonable to predict that 
Gamma biased people might behave unethically if beneficial consequences can justify their 
actions. However, the same people who value common interest and conformity might 
perceive others’ unethical actions differently. Therefore, Gamma biased individuals might use 
a ‘double standard’ to estimate the likelihood of the self and the others to engage in the same 
action, and this biased might be related to the magnitudes and the beneficiary of the expected 
consequences. Stogdill identified ethics as an essential component in leadership (Bass, 1988). 
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Therefore, a distorted self-perception of ethics could obscure organizational members, 
especially those in leadership positions, from monitoring their own actions and modeling 
ethical behavior for peers and subordinates.
A recent study demonstrated that student participants exhibited a form of self-
enhancement bias in their evaluation of self and others’ unethical propensity (Manley et al., 
2001). Interestingly, they also found a discrepancy between the unethical propensity 
evaluation of the self relative to others, and the discrepancy decreased as the probability of 
being penalized increased. An increase in accountability seems to prompt individuals to 
engage in a deliberate attribution process that had given a greater consideration to situational 
influences, such as consequences of being caught (Gawronski, 2003; Krull, 1988; Tetlock, 
1985; Uleman, Newman, & Mokskowitz, 1996). Therefore, the effect of a salient beneficiary 
and moral intensity with one’s ethical propensity might diminished by elevating the level of 
accountability, but moral intensity also increase the saliency of deontological reasoning in 
ethical evaluation.
Research Questions: Integration of Moral Intensity and Self-Evaluation Biases
Table 1 depicts the hypothetical influence of self-perception biases on the perceived 
moral intensity and the dominated ethical reasoning. The effect of self-perception bias, the 
Gamma bias, would be most salient within the high moral intense and self-relevant condition.  
The classical economic-rational decision-making theory predicted individuals were likely to 
engage in unethical behavior that directly benefiting the self-benefit; however, teleological 
ethics doctrine would also predicted that individuals would engage in unethical actions for the 
benefit of others, which would eventually benefiting the self through different venues such as 
psychological gratification or a long-term reward. Self-perceived pro- social oriented 
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individuals, such as the Gamma biased ones, were therefore likely to engage in unethical 
behavior to benefit the collective goods for their organization and community rather than 
solely for their own benefit. However, these Gamma biased individual would also be prone to 
the self-serving effects since they already had an enhanced sense of moralistic relative to the 
others. Therefore, the Gamma biased individuals were predicted to account for the salient 
contextual influences regarding his/her own unethical behavior meanwhile discounting the 
same contextual influences surrounding others people actions. Hence, Gamma biased 
individuals might be more likely to display a higher level of unethical propensity when 
organization and society was the salient beneficiaries than when the self was the only 
beneficiary. According to Paulhus and John (1998), the Gamma bias tendency correlated with 
traits such as consciousness and conformity; therefore, the self-enhanced Gamma biased 
individuals should likely underestimate their own unethical propensity more so relative to 
others’ in conditions where the positive pro-social outcomes could further enhance their self-
image. 
The effect of moral intensity should be a potential situational facet that influences one’s 
social judgment. Individuals should account for the salient situational factors, i.e., magnitude 
of consequences and concentration of effects, and make decisions of teleological ethics while 
maintaining their ethical self-perception. For example, Singer and Singer (1997) would have 
predicted outcomes that were beneficial to one’s organization and society might be evaluated 
as being less unethical than outcomes that benefit solely the self. 
When organization or society are the salient beneficiaries of unethical actions that 
unambiguously violate societal norms and standard, the magnitude of consequences and the 
concentration of effects that are sufficient to amplify one’s teleological ethical evaluation and 
20
overshadows the deontological ethical consideration. However, these same individuals might 
discount the same moral intensive elements preceded other people’s ethical nature and 
estimate these people would behave unethically regardless of the beneficiary. The integration 
of moral intensity and social perception generated two primary research questions. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The first research question concerns whether these individuals would perceive a 
discrepancy between their own ethical propensities relative to others’ ethical propensity, 
especially within high moral intensive conditions. The second research question concerns 
whether moral intensity influences one’s ethical propensity. Self-reported ethical propensity 
was predicted to be higher in the high magnitude conditions across the three levels of outcome 
concentration. In addition, self-reported ethical propensity is postulated to be higher in the 
high outcome concentration conditions when magnitudes of consequences were high. 
A third supplementary research question examine whether there was a threshold 
accountability level (i.e., probability of being caught and penalized) that could dissuade the 
continuation of displaying unethical actions. Past research showed participants’ self-reported 
ethical propensity decreased as the levels of accountability increased, but the level of 
accountability that deterred individuals’ ethical intention remains to be determined (Manley et 
al. 2001). Therefore, the current study will extend past findings by measuring the threshold 
level of accountability that could dissuade the display of unethical propensity, or display of 
deontological ethical decision-making.
According to the findings of self-evaluation and fundamental attribution error, Gamma 
biased individuals were likely to estimate different unethical propensity about them self and 
others’ ethical decision-making. Individuals were likely to account for the situational 
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influences (i.e. outcome consequences and magnitude) about their own actions but discounted 
the saliency of the same situational influences. Therefore, if Gamma biased individuals were 
to engage in unethical acts for the greater collective good than for their own benefits in a high 
moral intense situation (high magnitude and outcome concentration), then these individuals 
were engaging in teleological ethical decision-making and likely to believe the others would 
engage in the same unethical act but only more likely so. Thus, Gamma biased individuals 
were expected to make deontological ethical decisions in high personal gain condition and 
teleological ethical decisions in the two collective-gain conditions, while their estimation of 
others’ unethical propensity would remain consistently across the three outcome conditions. 
Therefore, the first research question predicted the magnitude of the Gamma bias would be 
lower in the two collective-good conditions than in the personal-gain condition because of the 
changes in self-reported unethical propensity as the effects of the Gamma bias of ethical 
propensity are postulated to be especially evidenced in the two “collective-gain” conditions
than in the self-gain condition.
Research Questions One and Two generated the following three hypotheses:
H1: The numerical mean of self-enhancement tendency of unethical 
propensity (Gamma Bias) should be increasing linearly with the 
ascending accountability levels.
H1.2: The numerical mean of the self-enhancement tendency of 
unethical propensity bias would be significantly smaller in the high 
organizational and societal gain conditions than in the high self-gain 
condition.
H2: Individuals with the self -enhanced ethical propensity bias could also display a 
higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high moral intensive 
condition (high magnitude and high outcome concentration) than in the lesser 
intense condition (low magnitude and high outcome concentration).
H3: Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical propensity could display 
a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high outcome 
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concentrated conditions (organizational and societal gain) than the low 
outcome concentrated condition (self-gain).
23
CHAPTER THREE
Methodology: Procedure and Analyses
Participants
Two hundred and seventy-three undergraduate students who enrolled in a management 
course participated in the survey research. The entire sample consisted of 172 male (63 %) 
and 100 female (37%), one participant did not indicated his/her gender. The average self-
reported Grade Point Average (GPA) was 3.25. The divisions of academic majors were as 
follows: 211 (77%) participants were business majors (34 Accounting, 60 Management, 21 
Finance, 24 Marketing, 72 Management Information Systems), and 61(23%) participants were
non-business majors. Two hundred fifty participants (92%) who identified themselves as 
United States nationals were retained for the subsequent analyses. Thirty students (11%) of 
other country nationals or those did not declare their nationalities were excluded from 
subsequent analyses to rule out cross-cultural effects as an explanatory variable.
Procedure
Participants completed an in-class exercise entitled “Student Opinion Questionnaire” 
which asked students’ perception of themselves and others regarding different types of 
unethical behavior and different factors which surrounded such behavior. No identifying 
information was required to encourage accurate and honest responses. Participants returned 
the completed survey and were rewarded with extra credit for their participation.
Instruments 
Demographic variables. According to Beu, Buckley, Harvey (2003) and Buckley, Wiese, 
and Harvey (1998), the following types of participants’ demographic data were collected to 
control for individual variance while analyzing variance of unethical propensity: Gender 
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(Male/Female), self-reported graded point average, citizenship (USA or International), and 
academic major.
Independent measures. Each participant indicated their perceived likelihood of engaging 
in an unethical action across 24 different vignettes. Vignettes were hypothetical cases where 
experimenters embedded manipulations and measured respondents’ ethical intention. An 
example of ethical decision-making study using detailed vignettes was Fritzsche and Becker 
(1984). The vignettes were created to ask each participant to imagine themselves in two 
situations: 1) him/herself versus an average student in a school context, 2) him/herself versus 
an average businessperson in a business context. Within each situation, participants would 
indicate the probability of themselves and the other to engage in different unethical actions for 
an expected positive outcome at 2 levels of outcome magnitude (high vs. low) and 3 levels of 
outcome concentration (personal, organizational, or societal). The followings were the sample 
vignettes: 
Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to ______________ (SELF, THE AVERAGE STUDENT, SELF IN 
BUSINESS, or THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON).
Suppose unethical behavior would result in ________ (high or minimal personal/organizational/societal)
gain.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), 
what is the probability that ________ (SELF, THE AVERAGE STUDENT, SELF IN BUSINESS, or THE 
AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON) would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in _______ (school or business)? 
(Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Stauffer (2003) used the above vignettes and found negative correlations within the -.40 
range between individuals’ self-reported unethical propensity with measures of altruism, 
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agreeableness, and organizational citizenship behavior. The negative relationship between the 
self-reported ethical propensity with the pro-social conventional oriented measures suggested 
the content of the vignettes could provoke respondents’ tendency to deliberately violating 
social norms. This study would further establish the content validity of the 24 vignettes 
through measuring inter-rater reliability on the perceived levels of outcome magnitude and 
concentration of effects. 
Response measures. Dependent measures were participants’ self-reported propensity 
to engage in unethical behavior.  This was operationalized as the self-reported likelihood of 
engaging in unethical acts and their perceived likelihood of others to engage in the same 
unethical behavior within each of the school and business scenarios. Within each vignette, the 
likelihood of being caught and penalized was increased in a 10% increment from 0% to 100%. 
Participants then indicated their perceived likelihoods (of self in school, an average student, 
self in business, and an average businessperson) to engage in an unethical behavior. 
The Gamma Bias measurement was modeled after the computation used in past 
studies’ (John and Robins, 1994; Paulhus and John, 1994; 1998). The discrepancy between 
self-reported tendency and perceived others tendency on the same variable was a form of self-
evaluation bias. Each individual’s bias index was then computed as the residual variance that 
remained after regressing perceived others measure on the self-reported measure within the 
same condition. The residual variance was the variance not shared between self-reported 
unethical propensity and perceived others unethical propensity. Therefore, self-reported 
unethical propensity would be regressed onto the perceived others unethical propensity for the 
same level of outcome and concentration of effects. For example, perceived others unethical 
propensity of the high self-gain condition was regressed on the self-reported unethical 
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propensity of the high self-gain condition. A positive residual represents individuals’ bias in 
perceiving themselves to be more ethical in comparison to the others and a negative residual 
represents individuals’ bias in perceiving themselves to be less ethical in comparison to the 
others. 
Analyses
H1 replicated Manley et al. (2000) in which the discrepancy between the self-reported and 
perceived others unethical propensity decreased as accountability increased. Therefore, this 
hypothesis predicted the same relationship between the Gamma Bias of ethical propensity in 
this study. The dependent measure was the self-evaluation bias, which was measured as the 
mean of each participant’s Self-Evaluation Bias Index (details of computing the self-
evaluation bias index would be discussed further in the Result Section). Two 11 (levels of 
accountability) x 3 (high-concentration effects conditions) x 2 (outcome magnitude) within-
subject ANCOVA analyses were computed to examine the main effect of accountability. 
Participants’ demographic data were the covariate variables to control for individual 
difference variability. If a significant accountability main effect emerged, then a linear trend 
contrasts would be tested for the positive relationship between numerical mean of self-
evaluation bias with accountability. H1.2 tested the assumption that Gamma Biased individuals 
could perceive others were more likely to engage in unethical actions for self-benefits than 
themselves would do; therefore, the mean of self-evaluation tendency would be significantly 
lower for the self-gain condition than the two collective good conditions.
H2 tested whether individuals of Gamma Bias would be more likely to engage an unethical 
action themselves for high moral intense situation.  The dependent measure was the mean of 
the self-reported unethical propensity. Two 11 (levels of accountability) x 2 (outcome 
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magnitude) x 3 (outcome concentration) within-subject ANCOVA analyses were computed to 
examine the variance of an overall mean difference in self-reported unethical propensity. 
Participants’ demographic data were the covariate variables to control for individual 
difference variability. If a significant omnibus effect emerged, then interaction contrasts 
would then locate the mean difference in the self-reported unethical propensity between the 
two conditions (high vs. low organizational gain, high vs. low societal gain) across the 11 
levels of accountability. 
H3 examined the relationship between the self-reported unethical propensity with 
outcome magnitude. Two 11 (levels of accountability) x 2 (outcome magnitude) x 3 (outcome 
concentration) within-subject ANCOVA analyses were computed to examine the variance of 
an overall mean difference in self-reported unethical propensity. If the outcome main effect 
emerged, then 2 sets of contrast would be tested to compare means between self-gain vs. 
organizational gain and self-gain vs. societal gain.
A supplementary research question was attempted to model the level of accountability 
that could deter individuals from engaging in unethical actions. Manley et al. (2001) reported 
a negative relationship between the levels of accountability with unethical propensity. Hence, 
preliminary analyses would be computed to determine a dissuading threshold level for 
unethical decisions across different moral intensive conditions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Results
Self Evaluation Bias (Gamma Bias): Enhancement Tendency vs. 
Diminishment Tendency.
Participants were grouped into either the self-enhancement or the self-
diminishment group based on their overall standardized residual, which was the sum of 
the 11 standardized residuals from each of the 11 accountability level (1- 0% to 11- 100% 
being caught and penalized) of each vignette. The standardized residuals were the 
variance remained after regressing unethical propensity of the perceived target 
comparison (an average student or an average businessperson) onto their self-reported 
unethical propensity. 
SelfshConai=a + *OthershConai  + shConai
SelfbhConai=a + *OtherbhConai + bhConai
Other – Perceived target comparison’s unethical propensity,
Self- Self reported unethical propensity,
s – An average student comparison,
b – An average businessperson comparison,
o – outcome magnitude,
Con- Outcome concentration (self-, organizational-, and societal- gain),
ai – Accountability levels, i=1-11
Negative standardized residuals meant individuals perceived others having a 
higher level of unethical propensity than their own, which then reflected respondents’ 
self-enhancement tendency in their ethical evaluation of themselves. The magnitude of 
the Gamma Bias corresponded with the numerical value of the negative standardized 
residuals. A positive standardized residual indicated individuals’ tendency to see others 
having a lower level of unethical propensity than their own, which suggested a self-
diminishment tendency. Past studies (i.e., John & Robins, 1999; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, 
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& Lysy, 2003, Paulhus & Robins, 2002) computed a single standardized residual for each 
participant by regressing self-reported ratings onto the ratings made by a third party or a 
target comparison, which then resulted in a single self-evaluation bias index. The current 
study computed a total of 66 standardized residuals for each participant across their 
responses over two outcome magnitude levels, three outcome concentration levels, and 
eleven levels of ascending ordered accountability. Each participant’s overall self-
evaluation bias index was the sum of the sixty-six standardized residuals.
Past studies (i.e., John & Robins, 1999; Paulhus & Robins, 2002) classified 
Gamma biased participants if their self-evaluation bias index was above zero (see the 
aforementioned studies for their explanation regarding the direction of self-evaluation 
bias indexes). This study examined self-enhancement tendency in unethical propensity; 
thus, negative standardized residuals in this context suggested the Gamma biased in the 
self-reported unethical propensity when in comparison to others. Therefore, 146 Gamma 
biased participants who had an overall negative self-evaluation bias index were retained 
for subsequent power calculation and hypotheses testing. 
Power Calculation: Sample Size Adequacy.
Post-hoc statistical power analyses for within-subject design’s main effect were 
computed to determine the probability of rejecting the null hypotheses when they were 
false. Power computation was calculated by GPower, a software package with algorithms 
that were developed based on Cohen’s work (1973, 1988) (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 
1998).
Two assumptions were made in order to calculate the statistical power of the 
existing sample size: 1) the population correlation between the within factors, and 2) the 
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effect size. Rho is the population correlation between the within factors, which was 
assumed to be 0.3, and the effect size was assumed to be in a medium range, .015, 
according to Cohen’s terminology. Therefore, given the current sample size of 146, three 
within-subject factors, the computed statistical power was 100% even after adjusting for 
the sphericity violation. A total of 146 Gamma biased participants was an adequate 
sample size.
Manipulation Checks: Raters Consensus and Reliability on Ethicality, Outcome 
Magnitude, and Outcome Concentration.
Post hoc manipulation checks were conducted to establish vignettes’ content 
validity and reliability in the study, as the data were collected for purposes other than the 
proposed hypotheses. Three independent raters evaluated a total of 24 vignettes (12 
vignettes for each of the school and business context) on the following three dimensions: 
ethicality, outcome magnitude, and outcome concentration. One rater was a psychology 
graduate student, and the two other raters were senior-level undergraduate students. Each 
rater was informed about the purpose of the study and the dimensions embedded within 
each vignettes, then each rater was presented with the following rating guide and rating 
form, plus the vignettes. Raters were asked to evaluate each targeted dimension, as they 
were to complete the survey. Raters’ consensuses were measured by intra-class 
correlation (ICC 2, k) which assessed the rater reliability when all cases were rated by the 
same raters for the mean of k ratings (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient () was also computed to assess response reliability among the three raters. 
The sample rating descriptions and questions are listed in the following page.
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Ethical Decision-Making Experimental Task Rating Guide
Thank you for agreeing to become a rater of the experimental task administrated in my 
research. The task was designed to capture respondents’ ethical propensity in different 
circumstances. 
Before you begin on your rating, please carefully read through the copy of experimental 
tasks provided to you. Make sure to read the description of each question carefully. Once 
you do this, proceed to the ratings. The purpose of the ratings is to gather your impression 
of the experimental tasks whether they are capturing what they are designed to measure 
(i.e., different raters share similar or dissimilar impression of the same task). 
Answer the following questions for each of the scenario (A-N) in the following pages. 
1) Do you think the suggested action was ethical or unethical?  1) Ethical 2) Unethical
2) Do you think the consequences would benefit 1) Self 2) Organization 3) Society?
3) What kind of impact would you believe the consequences have 1) High  2) 
Low?
Do you think the 
suggested action was 
ethical or unethical?  
Do you think the consequences 
would benefit
What kind of 
impact would you 
believe the 
consequences have
A. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
B. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
C. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
D. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
E. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
F. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
G. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
H. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
I. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
J. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
K. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
L. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
M.Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
N. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
O. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
P. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
Q. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
R. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
S. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
T. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
U. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
V. Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
W.Ethical Unethical  Self Organization  Society  High  Low
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All three raters achieved complete consensuses regarding the ethical nature of the 
issue embedded within in each vignette; therefore, the complete consensuses among 
raters suggested content validity of the vignettes.
Three raters disagreed on the outcome magnitude dimension embedded within the 
vignettes. The intra-class correlation was .89 and  = .88. The disagreement about 
different outcome magnitudes resided on the perceived likelihood of achieving a high-
magnitude beneficial outcome when engaging in the suggested unethical actions. 
Three raters disagreed on the outcome concentration dimension embedded within 
the vignettes. The intra-class correlation was .43 and  = .43, which suggested a lack of 
content validity and reliability of the targeted dimension. The disagreement mainly 
surrounded the outcomes of a societal scope where raters could not agree on whether the 
suggested beneficial societal consequences could be a direct result of the unethical 
actions. After removing the societal level responses, the intra-class correlation and 
reliability improved to an acceptable level, ICC=.73 and  = .79. Although the content 
validity and reliability of the outcome concentration dimension remained questionable, 
subsequent hypotheses testing still retain the societal- level responses but the result 
interpretation regarding societal level effect would be cautious. Suggestions for future 
study modification would be discussed in details at the study conclusion section.
Hypotheses One Testing.
Hypotheses 1 to 3 were analyzed twice, one for an average-student target 
comparison (self vs. average student) and one for the average businessperson target 
comparison (self vs. average businessperson). 
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H1: The mean of self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity 
(Gamma Bias) should be increasing linearly with the ascending 
accountability levels.
H1.2: The mean of the self-enhancement tendency of unethical 
propensity bias (Gamma Bias) would be significantly smaller in the 
high organizational and societal gain conditions than in the high self-
gain condition.
H1 tested for a positive linear trend of the means of SEB with ascending 
accountability levels. H1.2 tested two sets of contrast between means of SEB among the 
three levels of outcome concentration only within the high magnitude condition. 
A completely crossed 2(outcome magnitude – high vs. low) x 3(outcome 
concentration level – personal, organizational, and societal) x 11(accountability – 0% to 
100% being caught) within- subject analyses was computed with self-evaluation bias 
index (SEB) as the dependent variable. Gender, academic majors, and GPA were 
included in the analyses as covariates. Means, standard deviations, and within-subject 
analyses results were presented in the following tables. The magnitude of the self-
enhancement tendency in unethical propensity was measured by the negative numerical
value of SEB; the larger the numerical value of the negative standardized residuals, the 
higher magnitude of the Gamma biased.
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Self Evaluation Bias
Self vs. A Student (n=143) Self vs. A Businessperson 
(n=143)
GPA 3.18 (0.48) 3.17 (0.49)
SEB-High Personal -3.84 (4.7) -4.1 (5.0)
SEB-High Org. -3.94 (5.8) -4.3 (5.0)
SEB-High Societal -3.76 (4.5) -3.05 (8.1)
SEB-Low Personal -2.71 (4.9) -3.59 (6.3)
SEB-Low Org. -3.3 (5.0) -3.53 (4.8)
SEB-Low Societal -3.99 (4.3) -3.62 (6.0)
SEB – High gain -11.49 (11.78) -11.36 (12.4)
SEB- Low gain -9.98 (10.87) -10.74 (12.5)
SEB – Personal -6.52 (8.02) -7.6 (9.1)
SEB – Org. -7.25 (9.12) -7.8 (8.9)
SEB – Societal -7.7 (7.75) -6.6 (11)
Table 3. Correlations of Self Evaluation Bias with Outcome Magnitude and Outcome 
Levels
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1)GPA -- -.01 .10 -.11 -.025 -.08 -.036 -.20* -.18*
2) Gender .038 -- -.006 -.007 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -.06 -.07
3) Major .181* -.014 -- -.026 -.00 -.036 -.089 -.062 .065
4) SEB 
High/P
-.21* -.11 -0.012 -- .72** .036 .28 .50 ** .37 **
5) SEB 
High/O
-.047 -.02 0.007 .44 ** -- -.014 .26** .67** .44**
6) SEB 
High/S
-.116 -.049 0.017 .39 ** 0.42 ** -- -.00 .21* .22**
7) SEB 
Low/P
-.202 * -.01 0.044 .39 ** 0.27 ** 0.17 * -- .25** .16 
8) SEB 
Low/O
-.141 .00 0.03 0.36 ** 0.42 ** 0.53 ** 0.37 * -- .51**
9) SEB 
Low/S
-.091 -.016 0.081 0.39 ** 0.29 ** 0.55 ** 0.20 * 0.53 ** --
Self Evaluation Bias’s correlations of the business setting were above the diagonal.
*p<.05, ** p<.01
Tables 1 and 2 presented descriptive results of SEB for both target comparisons. 
Tables 3 and 4 presented the results of the within-subject analyses using SAS 8.0’s Proc 
Mixed. Proc Mixed was preferred over the GLM because Proc Mixed used list-wise 
deletion instead of pair-wise deletion for the missing responses, plus Proc Mixed offered 
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a greater flexibility and ease in testing different statistical assumptions and calculating 
contrast effects. Several statistical assumptions were tested, only the compound 
symmetric and autoregressive assumption reached an iteration convergence. When 
comparing the AIC fit statistics between the assumptions of compound symmetric and 
autoregressive. The autoregressive assumption resulted in a smaller AIC index, which 
suggested a better fit between the model and the data. Therefore, subsequent within-
subject analyses adopted the first order autoregressive assumption for computation. The 
basis of autoregressive assumption was that correlation would progressively decrease 
between each response with each of its subsequent response.
The means of SEB changed in the expected direction as the levels of outcome 
concentration changed (personal – organizational – societal) for both target comparisons. 
The following two tables presented results of the within-subject analyses for high and 
low outcome magnitude conditions and analyses for the high outcome magnitude 
condition only. GPA was a significant covariate for both target comparisons. GPA was 
significantly correlated with academic majors and with SEBs the two personal gain 
conditions for the average student comparison target, while it correlated significantly 
with the SEBs in the low organizational gain and societal gain conditions when the target 
comparison was an average businessperson. Accountability emerged as the only 
significant main effect, F (10, 1410) =41.4, p=.00 and F (10, 1400) =18.8, p=.00, 
respectively for the student and businessperson target comparison. A set of polynomial 
contrasts coding was used to test the positive linear trend of SEB means within the high 
and low outcome magnitude conditions.
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Within the high outcome magnitude condition, the linear trend analyses for both 
average student and businessperson target comparison were statistically significant, F (1, 
1410) =108.39, p=.00 and F (1, 1400) = 56.6, p=.00. Within the low outcome magnitude 
condition, the linear trend analyses for both average student and businessperson target 
comparison were also statistically significant, F (1, 1410) =137.79, p=.00 and F (1, 1400) 
= 55.7, p=.00. The following figure graphically depicted the positive relationship 
between the SEB’s mean with ascending levels of accountability. 
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Figure 1 . Linear Trend of SEB across High and Low Organization and Societal Gains.
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Figure 1.2. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity between Self with Target Comparisons.
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H1.2 was not supported as the SEB means did not differ significantly between the high 
organizational gain and the high societal gain conditions with the high personal gain 
condition. The mean contrast of SEB between the high organizational and high personal 
gain condition was F (1, 280) =0.35, p=.51 and F (1, 278) = 0.0, =1.0, respectively for 
each of the student and business target comparison. The mean contrast of SEB’s between 
the high societal gain and high personal gain condition was F (1, 280) =0.43, p=.51 and F 
(1, 278) = 1.79, p =.18, respectively for each of the student and business target 
comparison.
In sum, results supported the predicted positive linear trend of SEB means with 
the ascending levels of accountability. The magnitude of the self-enhanced bias of 
unethical propensity corresponded with its absolute value: As the mean approached zero, 
the magnitude of the self-enhanced bias became smaller as well. Regarding H 1.2, further 
analyses did not fully support the context dependence assumption in Gamma biased 
individuals’ estimation of self and others’ unethical propensity. Figure 1.2 graphically 
displayed the means of self-reported unethical propensity and perceived others’ unethical 
propensity. Gamma biased participants consistently commit to an unethical action, a 
reflection of the non-deontological ethics, and they also perceived others would do so at a 
greater extend. However, participants perceived other students were more likely to be 
unethical for their organization than for themselves (t (142) =2.08, p=.004) and for the 
society (t (143) =2.47, p=.014). However, Gamma biased participants perceived others to 
be consistently unethical across the different moral intense conditions. Therefore, the 
mean differences of perceiving others’ unethical propensity reflected the observer
accounted for the changes in the beneficiary only within the context of school but not in 
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the context of business. Thus, findings demonstrated that these Gammon biased 
individuals were making non-deontological ethics decisions in personal gain condition, 
and evaluating others’ ethicality differently according to the context of the actors.
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Table 4. Proc Mixed Overall Results of Self Evaluation Bias
Self vs. An Average Student Self vs. An Average 
Businessperson
Gender (1,134) 1.26, .264 (1,133) 3.75, .055
Major (5,134) 1.83, 0.11 (5,133) 1.34, .25
GPA (1,134) 16.9, <.0001 (1,133) 10.21, .002
Magnitude (1,134) 2.12, .15 (1,140) 0.28, .60
Level (2,282) 1.52, .22 (2,280) 1.37, .25
Accountability (10,1410) 41.37, <.0001 (10,1400) 18.77, <.0001
Mag. * Acct (10,1410) 0.60, .816 (10,1400) 0.42, .94
Mag. * Level (2,278) 1.68, .189 (2,278) 1.64, .19
Level * Acct. (20,2820) 0.78, .74 (20,2800) 0.66, .87
Mag.* Level * Acct. (20,2758) 0.92, .56 (20,2757) 0.36, .99
Table 5. Proc Mixed Result of Self Evaluation for the High Outcome Magnitude 
Condition
Self vs. An Average Student Self vs. An Average 
Businessperson
Gender (1,134) 1.06, .30 (1,133) 0.33, .57
Major (5,134) 1.87, .10 (5,133) 1.15, .34
GPA (1.134) 8.36, .005 (1,133) 4.29, 0.04
Level (2,280) .024, .79 (2,278) 2.66, .072
Accountability (10,1410) 14.9, <.0001 (10,1400) 7.25, <.0001
Level * Acct. (20,2789) .96, .51 (20,2772) 0.55, .944
Hypotheses Two and Three Testing.
H2: Individuals with the self -enhanced ethical propensity bias could also display a 
higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high moral intensive 
condition (high magnitude and high outcome concentration) than in the lesser 
intense condition (low magnitude and high outcome concentration).
H3: Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical propensity could display 
a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high outcome 
concentrated conditions (organizational and societal gain) than the low 
outcome concentrated condition (self-gain).
H2 and H3 examined the self-reported unethical propensity to see whether Gamma 
biased respondents would made different ethical decisions as the decision implications 
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and beneficiary changes. Therefore, a significant interaction effect between outcome 
concentrations with outcome magnitudes was predicted. A completely crossed 2(outcome 
magnitude – high vs. low) x 3(outcome concentration level – personal, organizational, 
and societal) x 11(accountability – 0% to 100% being caught) within subject analyses 
was computed with self-reported unethical propensity (UE) as the dependent variable. 
Analyses were based on the 146 respondent who exhibited the ethical self-enhancement 
tendency in the aforementioned analyses. Gender, academic majors, and GPA were 
included in the analyses as covariates. Means, standard deviations, and repeated measure 
results were presented in the following two tables.  Participant’s unethical propensity was 
measured by their self-reported likelihood of engaging in an unethical act. 
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Reported Unethical Propensity (UE)
Self  A Student Self A Businessperson
GPA 3.18 (0.48) 3.17 (0.49)
UE-High Personal 86 (101.1) 343.4 (189.2) 82.17 (108.6) 324.5 (196.1)
UE-High Org. 82.7 (117.1) 373.6 (197.3) 59.1 (78.98) 325.0 (187)
UE-High Societal 64.96 (87.8) 340.4 (195.6) 176.83 (210.1) 332.9 (198.8)
UE-Low Personal 33.86 (76.2) 229.9 (187.3) 71.11 (121.9) 306.8 (201.6)
UE-Low Org. 20.41 (38.6) 194.3 (172.9) 35.59 (60.9) 227.4 (180.9)
UE-Low Societal 25.03 (43.3) 235.5 (181.3) 55.94 (96.42) 253.8 (183.0)
UE – High gain 233.62 (237.4) 1052.4 (500) 317.1 (299.9) 998.9 (503.4)
UE- Low gain 79.31 (114.86) 656.4 (456.4) 162.7 (226.8) 788.0 (506.0)
UE – Personal 119.86 (138.1) 570.9 (336) 153.29 (188) 646.9 (363.6)
UE – Org. 103.1 (118.5) 565.3 (334) 94.89 (125.5) 553.32 (338.4)
UE – Societal 90.0 (118.5) 572.6 (347.9) 231.54 (258.2) 589.7 (348.9)
Table 7.Correlation of Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Outcome Magnitude and 
Outcome Levels
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1)GPA -- -.01 .10 -.19 -.12 -.07 -.12 -.27 -.20
2) Gender .04 -- -.01 -.05 -.21* -.11 .02 -.04 -.10
3) Major .18* -.014 -- -.10 -.04 -.11 -.1 -.08 -.08
4) SEB 
High/P
-.17* -.12 -.035 -- .77** .19* .33** .5** .37**
5) SEB 
High/O
-.05 -.12 -.022 .38** -- .2* .37** .6** .41**
6) SEB 
High/S
.02 -.14 -.14 .46** .38** -- .20* .26** .33**
7) SEB 
Low/P
-.09 -.08 .03 .20* .08 .13 -- .57** .39**
8) SEB 
Low/O
-.09 -.12 .1 .23** .43** .24** .22** -- .50**
9) SEB 
Low/S
-.1 -.01 -.23* .39** .15 .59** .23** .34** --
Self Evaluation Bias’s correlations of the business setting were above the diagonal.
p<.05, ** p<.01
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Results of means and standard deviations showed that the mean level of the self-
reported unethical propensity decreased as the levels of outcome concentration increased 
within the context of school. However, the level of self-reported propensity increased 
with the level of outcome concentration for the business context. This finding was 
unexpected as Manley et al. (2000) did not report any difference in self-reported 
unethical propensity between the contexts of school and business. 
The following two tables presented the ANOVA results using SAS 8.0’s Proc 
Mixed. Gender and GPA were significant covariates within the school context when 
comparing the self-reported unethical propensity and academic majors and GPA were the 
significant covariates within the context of business. All main effects were statistically 
significant within both school and business contexts. One exception was the outcome 
concentration main effect, which was non-significant within the context of school. The 
hypothesized two-way interaction between outcome magnitudes with outcome 
concentration was significant within both the context of school and business. 
H2 predicted Gamma biased individuals would have a higher mean level of self-
reported unethical propensity in the higher moral intensive condition (high magnitude 
and high concentrated) than in the lower moral intensive condition (low magnitude and 
high concentrated). Two contrast effects were tested: 1) high organizational gain versus 
low organizational gain, and 2) high societal gain versus low societal gain. Within the 
context of school, the mean level of self-reported unethical propensity was significantly 
higher in the high organizational gain condition (F (1,710) = 46.15, p=.00) and in the 
high societal gain condition (F (1,710) = 21.59, p=.009) than the mean level within their 
respective low outcome magnitude condition. Within the context of business, the mean 
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level of self-reported unethical propensity was not significantly higher in the high 
organizational gain condition (F (1,704) = 3.24, p=.07) than in its low outcome 
magnitude condition. However, the mean difference was significantly higher in the high 
societal gain condition (F (1,704) = 92.15, p=.00) than in its respective low gain 
condition.
H3 predicted Gamma biased individuals would have a higher mean level of self-
reported unethical propensity for the high magnitude societal and organizational gain 
than the high magnitude personal gain. Two mean contrasts were tested: 1) high personal 
gain condition with high organizational gain condition, and 2) high personal gain 
condition with high societal gain condition. Within the context of school, the self-
reported unethical propensity mean level between the high personal and high 
organizational gain conditions did not differ significantly, F (1,284) =2.64, p=.11, and the 
mean difference between the self-reported unethical propensity also did not differ 
significantly between high personal and high societal gain, F (1,284) =0.35, p=.56. 
Within the context of business, the self-reported unethical propensity mean difference 
between the high personal and high organizational gain was not significant (F (1,281) 
=2.64, p=.14), but it was significantly different between the high personal and high 
societal gain conditions (F (1,281) =33.74, p<.0001).
In sum, the statistically significant interaction between outcome magnitude with 
outcome concentration and the subsequent contrast testing supported Hypothesis2 but did 
not support H3. According to H2, those Gamma biased individuals would engage in the 
suggested unethical act for high outcome magnitude. However, evidence did not support 
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H3 that these Gamma biased individuals were not likely to engage in the suggested 
unethical act for the greater collective benefit than for their own self-benefit. 
Results suggested participants did not differ in their willingness to engage in an 
unethical act solely for self-benefit and for an organizational benefit. However, 
organizational commitment, organizational identification, and the organizational 
culture/climate would influence one’s willingness to engage in ethical decision-making 
for the benefit of an organization. Therefore, the non-significant mean difference might 
due to failure to control for these organizational variables.
The interpretation of the significant mean differences of the unethical propensity 
between self-gain and societal-gain conditions should be with cautions because of the low 
consensus among raters over the societal outcome dimension. First, participants’ 
willingness to engage in the unethical acts for a greater societal gain did not exceed that 
for their own personal benefit within the context of school. Raters’ comments suggested 
that the lack of an example of a realistic societal outcome as a result of behaving 
unethically in school might obscure the effectiveness in capturing the dilemma between 
participants’ societal concerns and their ethical values. Another interpretation regarding 
the mean difference in unethical propensity between the personal-gain versus the 
societal-gain in the context of business as the reflection of the voluminous corporate 
scandals reported in the media, which could fuel the negative stereotypes of business 
ethics. Therefore, negative business ethics stereotypes might suggest a higher level of 
tolerance and acceptability of unethical actions, especially when the goodness of the 
outcome outweighed the negative of the action.  
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Table 8. Proc Mixed Results of Self-Reported Ethical Propensity
Self vs. An Average Student Self vs. An Average 
Businessperson
Gender (1,135) 6.6, .011 (1,134) 2.19, .14
Major (5,135) 0.41, .84 (5,134) 2.16, .06
GPA (1,135) 4.21, .04 (1,134) 13.6, .00
Magnitude (1,142) 71.0, <.0001 (1,141) 36.5, .00
Level (2,284) 2.66, .072 (2,282) 31.8, .00
Accountability (10,1420) 395, <.000 (10,1410) 391.3, .00
Mag. * Acct (2,284) 1.04, .35 (2,281) 20.3, .00
Mag. * Level (10,1420) 42.1, <.0001 (10,1410) 9.9, .00
Level * Acct. (20,2840) 0.81, .71 (20,2820) 2.3, .00
Mag.* Level * Acct. (20,2834) 1.08, .36 (20,2807) 1.5, .061
Table 9. Proc Mixed Result of Self -Reported Ethical Propensity for the High Gain 
Condition
Self vs. An Average Student Self vs. An Average 
Businessperson
Gender (1,135) 4.92, .028 (1,134) 1.98, .16
Major (5,135) 0.25, 0.94 (5,135) 1.32, .26
GPA (1,135) 2.12, .15 (1,134) 5.77, .018
Level (2,284) 1.38, .25 (2,281) 32.9, .00
Accountability (10,1420) 233.7, .00 (10,1410) 178.0, .00
Level * Acct. (20,2836) 1.08, 0.36 (20,2810) 2.24,.001
Dissuading Effects of Accountability on Unethical Decision-Making.
Figure 1 depicted the negative relationship between the unethical decision-making 
with the ascending levels of accountability (0% to 100%) for both school and business 
contexts. Within each of the context, the relationship was negative but the likelihood of 
unethical decision-making never fully diminished even when the chance of being caught 
and penalized reached the level of 100%. Initially, the likelihood of unethical decision-
making decreased more than 10% (a 11% decrease in the school context and a 13% 
decrease in the business context) when the accountability level rose from no chance of 
being caught and penalized to a 10% likelihood. However, the likelihood of unethical 
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decision-making no longer decreased as the accountability went above 50%. Thus, when 
the chance of being caught and penalized was above 50%, the average likelihood of 
unethical decision-making was 0.79% and 1.25% respectively for a school and a business 
organization versus the 8.02% and 12.23% when the accountability was below 50%. 
Therefore, the observed level of accountability that effectively dissuaded participants 
from engaging in the suggested unethical decisions for both school and business contexts 
was 50%. 
The next table presented the means and standard deviations of self-reported 
unethical propensity at each level of accountability for all conditions. Figures 1-3 were 
the graphical representations of the relationship between the average self-reported 
unethical propensities at each accountability level across for each condition. 
48
Table 10. Means and Standard Deviations of Unethical Propensity at Each Accountability 
Level within a School and a Business Organization.
High 
Personal
High Org. High 
Societal
Low 
Personal
Low Org. High 
Societal
% M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
School Organization
0 38.2 33.8 32.7 32.3 29.45 30.9 15.07 24.8 12.19 20.1 14.86 22.7
10 20.4 26.9 17.5 25.3 15 22 7.67 16.8 4.45 12 5.07 10.9
20 12.14 20.2 11.85 20.7 8.36 16.4 3.67 11.8 2.12 7.2 2.53 7.7
30 7.19 15.7 8.77 19.5 4.79 11.8 2.47 9.7 0.82 3.62 1.38 5.5
40 4.2 11.2 4.9 14.3 3.1 9.3 1.38 7.9 0.48 2.4 0.62 2.7
50 2.12 6.9 3.4 11.6 1.64 7.2 1.23 7.2 0.21 1.42 0.14 1.7
60 0.69 3.7 1.37 5.9 0.96 5.2 1.09 6.9 0.21 1.42 0.14 1.7
70 0.34 2.17 0.96 4.6 0.62 3.8 0.55 3.86 0 0 0.07 0.8
80 0.21 1.88 0.48 2.96 0.34 2.2 0.21 1.4 0 0 0.07 0.8
90 0.07 0.8 0.21 1.4 0.21 1.4 0.0 0.0. 0. 0 0 0
100 0. 0 0.07 0.83 0.68 0.83 0. 0 0 0 0 0
.Business Organization
0 33.85 34.8 28.39 32.1 47.0 36.2 28.2 32.6 19.0 27.4 23.7 29.8
10 20.6 28.3 14.3 21.9 34.3 33.7 15.5 24.8 7.69 14.8 11.8 20.8
20 12.31 20.8 8.18 15.6 28.24 42.6 9.37 18.6 4.19 11.0 6.99 16.4
30 7.55 14.9 4.83 11.4 20.4 28.9 6.01 15.4 1.96 7.3 5.03 13.7
40 4.34 11.2 20.3 6.67 14.44 24 4.27 12.9 1.33 5.8 3.36 10.7
50 1.96 8 0.91 4.26 10.5 19.9 2.94 11.3 0.77 3.9 2.38 8.4
60 0.91 4.43 0.42 2.62 6.97 16.1 1.68 8.3 0.49 2.7 1.4 5.93
70 0.42 3.1 0.2 1.44 5.3 14.1 1.33 7.14 0.14 1.2 0.77 4.3
80 0.21 1.9 0.07 0.8 4.37 13.1 0.8 4.7 0 0 0.28 1.7
90 0.07 0.84 0 0 2.96 10.2 0.63 4 0 0 0.21 1.4
100 0 0 0 0 2.69 9.5 0.49 3.4 0. 0 0 0
The high values correspond to a high likelihood to engage in an unethical action.
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Figure 2. Relationship between Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability. 
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Figure 3 depicted the relationship between the average likelihood of unethical 
decision-making in a school organization at each level of accountability respectively for 
the high and low outcome magnitude. For each of the outcome concentration condition, 
participants’ willingness to engage the suggested unethical decisions diminishing as the 
likelihood of being caught and punished increased; their willingness dropped below 1% 
as the accountability level exceeded 50%. The average likelihood of unethical decision-
making above the 50% accountability level was 0.26%, 0.62%, and 0.44% respectively 
for each of the high personal, high organizational, and high societal gain outcome. The 
average likelihood unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level was 
0.37%, 0.0%, and 0.05% respectively for each of the low personal, low organizational, 
and low societal gain outcome.
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Figure 3. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the School Context
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Figure 4 depicted the relationship between the average likelihood of unethical 
decision-making in a business organization at each level of accountability for the high 
and low outcome magnitude, respectively. For the high personal and high organizational 
gain condition, participants’ willingness to engage the suggested unethical actions 
diminished as the likelihood of being caught and punished increased; their willingness 
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dropped below 1% as the accountability level exceeded the 50% likelihood. The average 
likelihood of making unethical decisions above the level of 50% accountability was 
0.32% and 0.14% respectively for each of the high personal and high organizational gain 
outcome. A noted exception was the unethical decision-making within the high societal 
gain condition: its average likelihood of unethical decision-making diminished below 5% 
until it reached the accountability level of 80%. When the outcome magnitude was low, 
the average likelihood of unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level 
was 0.99%, 0.13%, and 0.53% respectively for each of the personal, organizational, and 
societal gain outcome.
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Figure 5. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the Business 
Context
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In sum, respondents consistently making an ethical decision, by not engaging in 
an unethical action, when the chance of being caught and punished exceed 50%, with one 
exception. Not only did the means of the self-reported unethical propensities decrease 
with an increased in accountability, the variations of the responses also decreased as well. 
The decreased in standard deviations implied a lesser degree of variability in making an 
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unethical decision as the accountability increased. The one exception to the 
aforementioned observed trend of means and standard deviations was that individual 
were willing to continue in engaging an unethical action for the benefit of the society in a 
business organization given a definite chance of being caught and punished. This finding 
was unexpected but this observation perhaps reflected the effects of teleological ethics 
doctrine, as well as the stereotypes of a higher level of tolerance and acceptability of 
unethical business conducts.  
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Table 11. Figure 2. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the School 
Context
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Figure 3 depicted the relationship between the average likelihood of unethical 
decision-making in a business organization at each level of accountability for the high 
and low outcome magnitude, respectively. For the high personal and high organizational 
gain condition, participants’ willingness to engage the suggested unethical actions 
diminished as the likelihood of being caught and punished increased; their willingness 
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dropped below 1% as the accountability level exceeded the 50% likelihood. The average 
likelihood of making unethical decisions above the level of 50% accountability was 
0.32% and 0.14% respectively for each of the high personal and high organizational gain 
outcome. A noted exception was the unethical decision-making within the high societal 
gain condition: its average likelihood of unethical decision-making diminished below 5% 
until it reached the accountability level of 80%. When the outcome magnitude was low, 
the average likelihood of unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level 
was 0.99%, 0.13%, and 0.53% respectively for each of the personal, organizational, and 
societal gain outcome.
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Figure 4. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the Business 
Context
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In summary, respondents consistently making an ethical decision, by not engaging 
in an unethical action, when the chance of being caught and punished exceed 50%, with 
one exception. Not only did the means of the self-reported unethical propensities 
decrease with an increased in accountability, the variations of the responses also 
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decreased as well. The decreased in standard deviations implied a lesser degree of 
variability in making an unethical decision as the accountability increased. The one 
exception to the aforementioned observed trend of means and standard deviations was 
that individual were willing to continue in engaging an unethical action for the benefit of 
the society in a business organization with a definite chance of being caught and 
punished. This finding was unexpected but this observation perhaps reflected the effects 
of teleological ethics doctrine, as well as the stereotypes of a higher level of tolerance and 
acceptability of unethical business conducts.  
Table 10 is a brief summary of the aforementioned hypotheses and their findings. 
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Table 10 Hypotheses Testing Summary
H1: The numerical mean of self-
enhancement tendency of 
unethical propensity (Gamma 
Bias) should be increasing linearly 
with the ascending accountability 
levels.
The hypothesis was supported for 
both school and business 
organizations.
H1.2: The numerical mean of the self-
enhancement tendency of unethical 
propensity bias would be 
significantly smaller in the high 
organizational and societal gain 
conditions than in the high self-
gain condition.
The hypothesis was not supported.
Participants’ Gamma biases did not 
differ significantly between the high 
personal and high organizational gain 
conditions, as well as between the high 
personal and high societal gain 
conditions. 
Same patterns of SEB mean difference 
were observed in the context of school 
and business.
H2: Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical 
propensity bias could also display a higher 
level of self-reported unethical propensity in 
the high moral intensive condition (both high 
magnitude and high outcome concentration) 
than in the lower moral intense condition (low 
magnitude and high outcome concentration).
The hypothesis was partially 
supported. 
Gamma biased participants reported a 
higher mean level of unethical 
propensity in the higher moral intense 
condition than in the lower moral 
intense condition.
Same patterns of mean differences 
were observed within school and 
business organizations.
One exception was that the unethical 
propensity did not differ 
significantlybetween the high and low 
organizational gain condition within a 
business organization.
H3: Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical 
propensity could display a higher level of self-
reported unethical propensity in the high 
outcome concentrated conditions 
(organizational and societal gain) than the low 
outcome concentrated condition (self-gain).
Hypothesis was partially supported
for a business organizational context.
Gamma biased participants reported a 
significantly higher mean level of 
unethical propensity in the high 
societal-gain condition than the high 
self-gain condition within the business 
organizational context.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the ethical decision-making process 
as both the levels and the scopes of the consequences were manipulated. The purpose was 
threefold: 1) to investigate the effect of accountability on ethical decision-making; 2) to 
analyze the relationship between the Gamma bias with moral intensity; 3) to analyze the 
effect of moral intensity on Gamma biased individuals’ ethical decision-making. The 
significance of such investigation stemmed from the philosophical debate revolved 
between teleological versus deontological ethicists (Kline, 2003; Lefkowitz, 2003). 
Specifically, this study attempted to explore whether individuals use different ethical 
behaviors in response to changes in situations, namely the outcome magnitude and 
outcome concentration. An additional focus then targeted individuals with a self-inflated 
sense of moral righteousness by questioning whether these individuals would engage in a 
utilitarian, teleological or the principle abiding, deontological orientation in decision -
making. Economic theorists had have long argued that individuals were self-interest 
driven by engaging only in egotistical, self-beneficial behavior. Teleological ethics 
perspective not only complements economists’ self-interest position in ethical decision-
making, but the utilitarian outcomes would also include others-oriented outcomes that are 
indirectly self-beneficial. Individuals of a teleological ethics orientation might make 
unethical decisions to enhance the social institutions such as a school, a business
organization, and a greater social community; although the personal benefit might not be 
salient at the time. Individuals of deontological orientation should forgo the benefits of 
60
unethical actions because of their pro-social beliefs in conforming to moralistic rules and 
legal regulations. These individuals were therefore believed to ascribe themselves as 
being ethical because of the legitimacy in following norms and rules. 
Social psychology research recently proposed of different forms of self-evaluation
bias as a manifestation of self-defense mechanism, the Alpha bias and the Gamma bias 
(Paulhus & John, 1998). The Gamma bias was a form of self-evaluation bias that 
individuals would either self-enhance or self-diminish their own moral characters. 
Therefore, the enhanced Gamma biased characteristics (i.e. conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, collectivism) might be associated with a deontological ethics orientation. 
This study then examined whether the enhanced Gamma biased individual would engage 
in an unambiguous unethical act when beneficial societal and organizational outcome 
could also enhance their pro-social self-perception. Furthermore, Gamma biased 
individuals might also be susceptible to a common social perception fallacy, the 
Fundamental Attribution Error, by discounting salient circumstantial motivations for 
other’s unethical decisions but not for their own actions. Hence, an empirical question 
investigated whether the Gamma biased individuals would behave unethically because of 
the social judgment fallacy where salient non-egotistical beneficial outcomes could 
maintain their pro-social self-concept but yet violating the ethical principles. 
Result Summary.
The magnitude of the enhanced Gamma bias decreased when chance of being 
caught increased, but it did not change with the different outcome scopes as had been 
predicted. The narrowing discrepancy between individuals’ assessment of self and others’ 
ethical propensity with increases in accountability essentially replicated Manley et al. 
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(2001) findings, which suggested the responsibility of justifying and defending one’s 
actions would motivate one to exert greater cognitive effort to anticipate the implication 
of decisions  thus given greater consideration to the issue and its consequences. A similar 
negative effect of accountability on self-evaluation bias was reported in Sedikides et al. 
(2002) were the discrepancy between the self-estimated grade with the objective grade 
narrowed as respondents was liable to justify their estimation. 
Furthermore, the discrepancy between individuals’ self-reported likelihood to 
engage in unethical acts in comparison to the perceived likelihood of others to do so did 
not change with high moral intensive situation. In the context of school, Gamma biased 
individuals’ self-reported unethical propensity was not significantly higher within the 
organizational- and societal-gain conditions than in the personal-gain condition. They 
also perceived others to be more likely to be unethical for the organizational gain than for 
the personal or societal gain. Within the context of business, Gamma biased individuals’ 
self-reported unethical propensity was significantly higher in the societal gain condition 
and perceived no differences in others’ unethical propensity across three beneficiary 
conditions. Although the self-reported ethical propensity and perceived others propensity 
changed with condition, the pattern was not predicted by the self-serving bias.
Two implications concerned the relationship between moral intensity with 
Gamma biased individuals’ ethical decision-making that helped to clarify the ambiguity 
around the issue of moral intensity. In general, Gamma biased individuals reported a 
higher likelihood to engage in the suggested unethical act for a higher magnitude 
outcome than for the lower magnitude outcome. The first implication was that the 
Gamma biased individuals’ decision-making did not reflect the deontological ethics. The 
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second implication was that the Gamma biased individuals exhibited teleological ethics
orientation and the likelihood to engage in an unethical act was higher at the higher moral 
intense level. However, one exception was found within a business-organization context 
where no difference between individuals’ willingness to engage in an unethical act 
whether the outcomes could greatly profit the organization or not. This finding might 
attribute to the organizational ethics culture and climate, plus individuals’ organizational 
commitment and organizational citizenship behavior. 
These unique organizational behavior factors reflect the organizational tolerance 
and governances in regulating unethical actions, and members’ identification with the 
organization. If organization tolerated unethical behavior as a means to reach strategic 
goals and its members identified with this objective, then individuals would behave 
unethically for consequences that not necessarily benefiting them directly at times. A 
final significant finding was that the Gamma biased individuals were more likely to 
behave unethically for a social cause than for their own personal gain only within the 
business context. However, this finding should be interpreted in light of the raters’ 
consensus that the societal-outcome dilemma embedded within the vignettes was not well 
understood by the participants; therefore, this particular statistical significant finding 
could not be interpreted as a strong support for utilitarian ethics.
In summary, this study found the tendency of perceiving the self to be more 
ethical than others was consistent across different scope and types of outcomes. 
Furthermore, the Gamma biased individuals, on average, demonstrated teleological ethics 
reasoning rather than the previously expected deontological orientation. The Gamma 
biased individuals made teleological ethical decisions consistently for egoistical gains as 
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well as for others-oriented gains. In addition, collective findings of the supplemental 
analyses suggested participants would not engage in unethical actions when the chance of 
being caught went above 50%. Although the accountability was operationalized as a 
direct estimation of the subjective probability to act, that was deemed to be a less optimal 
means to reflect one’s decision-making process (Godden, 1976). Nevertheless, the result 
demonstrated a less sensitive measure such as this could still capture the calculated risk 
estimation made in ethical decision-making process. Therefore, accountability scales 
incorporate behavior anchors that depicting different behavioral consequences would be a 
more precise measure of individuals’ ethical decisions in response to accountability. 
Implications for Theory and Future Research.
Current study integrated business ethics research with social psychological 
research, which yielded some insights onto the dynamic of ethical decision-making. 
Jones’ (1991) seminal work on moral intensity has inspired numerous empirical studies to 
examine the circumstantial effect on one’s ethical decision-making. Indeed, the 
economists seem to be partly correct in their positions of the self-interested driven and 
risk calculated in ethical decision behavior, especially when unethical decision-making 
was exhibited by those who actually esteemed their own ethical values over others. 
Results of this study did not support the findings reported in Stauffer (2002) where 
individuals were most likely to engage in unethical behavior for the greater gain of the 
society than for the personal gain and an organizational gain. Past studies of different 
types of Gamma bias has focused on individuals’ self-perception, motivation, and 
impression management. However, this study was an initial step to examine the work
behavioral implications of the enhanced Gamma bias. Self enhanced Gamma biased 
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individuals would engage in unethical actions while perceiving others making unethical 
decisions, but only more likely so. Therefore, future studies are needed to examine 
enhanced Gamma biased individual’s ethical behavior within a competitive (i.e. prisoner 
dilemma, tic for tat) and a cooperative (i.e. teamwork) situation. According to this study, 
Gamma biased individuals would likely to over-estimate their competitors’ unethical 
propensity and therefore engaging in aggressive tactics to maximize self-benefits while 
minimizing others’ gains, regardless of opponents’ intention. 
Findings suggested higher levels of accountability (i.e. above 50 percent), could 
deter individuals from unethical decision-making. Although the effect of different levels 
of accountability was not a main objective of the current study and the generalization of 
these findings are limited, but the result suggested participants seem to use a 
psychological ‘threshold’ to determine whether the potential gain would offset the 
potential risk of engaging in an unethical act. The ratio-scale representation of 
accountability might not be not as sensitive a measure to approximate respondents’ 
conception of accountability as behavioral anchor scales. Behavior anchors could depict 
accountability as different situations where expectation and responsibility for the 
individuals to justify their unethical actions to others. A greater generalization and 
prediction can draw by using specific behavioral anchor-scales.
Although the results failed to support the original propositions, the findings still 
shed some important insights about the enhanced Gamma biased individuals’ ethical 
intention and the prediction of potentially unethical behavior.
Implications for Organizations
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In general, enhanced Gamma biased individuals will engage in unethical 
behavior, equally if not more so, when it benefited themselves as opposed to benefit the 
organization or the society. Self-perceived ethical individuals did behave egoistically, 
according to the rational economist position that individuals should value their own 
interest as much as for the interest of their school, business organization, and their 
community . One realistic implication is that organizational members not only engage in 
unethical decision making for their own self-interest, but would do so for causes that they 
support. According to the agency theory (i.e. Bowie & Freeman, 1992; Weaver, Trevino, 
& Cochran, 1999), the goal of effective organizational governances is harmonizing 
agents’ objective with organizational agenda. This study therefore suggests that 
organizational members would behave unethically for personal agenda, as well as for a 
collectively beneficial objective (Trevino, Butterfield, & McCabe, 2001). Managers are 
then faced with the dilemma of monitoring members’ unethical behavior not only as a 
manifestation of self-interested, but it can also be a manifestation of the salient pressure 
of meeting strategic goals and organization’s ethics culture and climate (Gatewood & 
Carroll, 1991). 
Study Limitations and Conclusion.
This study was an ongoing research effort to capture students’ ethical propensity 
under different circumstances; hence, the lack of external generalization was one of the 
study’s limitations. Student participants might have limited life and work experiences to 
reflect upon their hypothetical decisions in some of the vignettes; thus, findings of this 
study might not be applicable to organizational members who might actually make 
similar decisions instead of the hypothetical ones. Furthermore, Maxwell & Ames (1981) 
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suggested seasoned executives would make different ethical decisions than those with 
lesser experience, suggested that work experience is a potential variable in predicting 
one’s ethical propensity. 
Another limitation of the study was the levels of complexity in this within-subject 
design. Each of the sixty-six vignette and its response scale was related to its subsequent 
one; therefore, the autoregressive effect would distort the later responses. Future studies 
could computerize the test administration that the items order could be randomized for 
each participant. In addition, a third party’s evaluation of respondents’ ethics would be a 
superior way to generate the self-evaluation bias index. Another limitation of the study 
design was the missing control of Gamma biased individuals’ ethical orientation prior to 
the study. Future study would be beneficial to investigate whether ethical orientation 
would change with different levels of moral intensity.
Summary
In general, this study attempted to understand ethical decision-making motivated 
by immediate beneficial outcomes through the perspective of moral intensity and social 
perception. Gamma biased respondents in this study, on average as a group, demonstrated 
teleological orientation rather than the deontological orientation in decision-making. 
Although deontological ethics decision making is not necessary the best practices for 
profits and strategic growth, organizations are obliged to be socially responsible to its 
stakeholders, stockholders, members, customers, and community. In the absence of 
conflict of interest, as investigated in this study, individuals had demonstrated utilitarian 
rather than principle-oriented decision-making, then when and how deontological ethics 
would prevail as multiple constituents’ objectives are at odds. The supplemental analyses 
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revealed accountability as a key motivation to practice deontological ethics. Future 
researches to quantify and qualify different accountability are necessary to gain a glimpse 
of the complex ethical decision-making. 
In summary, the current study was a continuation of Manley et al. (2001) and 
Stauffer (2002) and accomplished three objectives. First, the study examined the self-
enhancement bias observed in Manley et al. (2002), which did not change with outcome 
magnitudes and concentration, but decreased as the levels of accountability elevated. 
Second, the study reinforced a relationship between outcome magnitudes with unethical 
propensity (Pauli and May, 2002) but did not find conclusive evidence to support 
relationships between outcome concentration with unethical propensity. Somehow, the 
ultimate question of why people made unethical decisions seemed to be answered by the 
economists: individuals would make unethical decisions for self-relevant gains, whether 
the self or the others were the salient beneficiary. Even the respondents who believed 
others to be more unethical would continue making unethical decisions, as long as they 
perceive the chance of them being held responsible for their actions was less than an half. 
Individuals choose to make ethical decision on a teleological- deontological continuum 
rather than seeing these two ethical perspectives as two orthogonal doctrines. Further 
studies are warranted to explore the teleological-deontological continuum to predict the 
various forms of unethical behaviors in a workplace (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). 
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Appendix
Student Opinion Questionnaire
There is a common perception that many people, given an opportunity, will engage in unethical behavior. 
Yet, many others believe that most people are honest and ethical. We are interested in your perception of 
yourself and others regarding unethical behavior (misrepresenting another’s ideas and efforts are one’s 
own) and the factors which surround such behavior. No identifying information is required, so we ask that 
you please be candid. Thank you.
A. In order that we may gain an understanding of business students – how they feel, think, react, and 
so on – please indicate your responses to the following statements about how you feel about 
yourself and aspects of your emotions and behavior. Indicate whether each statement is very much 
like you, like you, neither like you nor unlike you, unlike you, or very much unlike you. (Please 
circle your response to each item).
Very 
Much 
Like Me
Like Me Neither 
Like Me 
Nor 
Like Me
Unlike 
Me
Very 
Much 
Unlike 
Me
1. I made a better leader than a follower. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I am usually quite confident when learning a 
new game or sport.
1 2 3 4 5
3. I feel self-conscious in a strange group. 1 2 3 4 5
4. It is easy for me to strike up a conversation 
with someone.
1 2 3 4 5
5. I have always been a popular person. 1 2 3 4 5
6. I am ill at ease when I am meeting new people. 1 2 3 4 5
7. I enjoy stating my opinions in front of a group. 1 2 3 4 5
8. I often wish that I were more outgoing. 1 2 3 4 5
9. People seem to be interested in getting to know 
me better.
1 2 3 4 5
10. I am seldom at a loss of words. 1 2 3 4 5
11. I seem to do more listening than talking in 
conversation with others.
1 2 3 4 5
12. I usually try to add a little zest to a party. 1 2 3 4 5
13. I have trouble expressing my opinion. 1 2 3 4 5
14. I like to remain unnoticed when others are 
around.
1 2 3 4 5
15. I prefer to go to social functions with a group 
of people so as not to stand out.
1 2 3 4 5
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B. Answer each question according to what is generally true to you. (Please circle your response to 
each item)
Almost 
Always 
True
Usually 
True
Seldom 
True
Never 
True
1. I do not like to wait for other people to complete 
their work before I can proceed with my own.
1 2 3 4
2. I hate to wait in most lines. 1 2 3 4
3. People tell me that I tend to get irritated too 
easily.
1 2 3 4
4. Whenever possible, I try to make activities 
competitive.
1 2 3 4
5. I have a tendency to rush into work that needs to
be done before knowing the procedure I will use to 
complete the job.
1 2 3 4
6. Even when I go on vacation, I usually take some 
work along.
1 2 3 4
7. When I make a mistake, it is usually due to the 
fact that I have rushed into the job before 
completely planning it through.
1 2 3 4
8. I feel guilty for taking time off from 
work/school.
1 2 3 4
9. People tell me I have a bad temper when it 
comes to competitive situations.
1 2 3 4
I tend to lose my temper when I am under a lot of 
pressure at work.
1 2 3 4
11. Whenever possible, I will attempt to complete 
two or more tasks at once.
1 2 3 4
12. I tend to race against the clock. 1 2 3 4
13. I have no patience for lateness. 1 2 3 4
14. I catch myself rushing when there is no need. 1 2 3 4
For section D through AE, please circle the appropriate probability of engaging in 
unethical behavior for each probability of being caught and penalized. There are 11 
questions to each section, one question per chance of being caught and penalized 
(0%,10%,20%,…,100%).
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C. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high societal gain.  Given that the chances of being 
caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would 
engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in 
unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
D. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal societal gain.  Given that the chances of being 
caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would 
engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in 
unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ch
an
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t a
n
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iz
ed
11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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E. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal societal gain.  Given that the chances of being caught 
and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE 
STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate 
probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
F. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high societal gain.  Given that the chances of being 
caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would 
engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in 
unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ch
an
ce
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iz
ed
11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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G. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in high societal gain.  Given that the chances of being caught and 
penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE 
BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the 
appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
H. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal societal gain.  Given that the chances of being 
caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would 
engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in 
unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ch
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11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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I. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal societal gain.  Given that the chances of being caught 
and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE 
PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate 
probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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J. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high organization gain, such as maintaining a minimal 
aggregate GPA which is necessary to keep a fraternity/sorority character. Given that the chances of being 
caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would 
engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in 
unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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K. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high organizational gain, such as maintaining a minimal 
aggregate GPA which is necessary to keep a fraternity/sorority charter.  Given that the chances of being 
caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE 
AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the 
appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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L. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal organizational gain.  It will not improve your 
organization in a tangible manner. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific 
percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in 
school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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M. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal organizational gain. It will not improve his/her 
organization in a tangible manner. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific 
percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in 
unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical 
behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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N. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high organizational gain, such as engaging in bribery of 
public officials to obtain business in a foreign country which will more than double the organization’s 
business, assuring profibability.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific 
percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in 
business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ch
an
ce
s 
o
f b
ei
n
g 
ca
u
gh
t a
n
d 
pe
n
al
iz
ed
11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
84
O. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.
Suppose unethical behavior by the average business person would result in high organizational gain, such 
as engaging in bribery of public officials to obtain business in a foreign country which will than double the 
organization’s business, assuring profitability. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are 
some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON 
would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of 
engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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P. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal organizational gain, such as doing whatever it 
takes to keep a contract which is worth minimal profit, in an industry that differs little new business 
opportunities.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 
100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please 
circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Q. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.
Suppose unethical behavior by the average business person would result in minimal organizational gain, 
such as doing whatever it takes to keep a contract which is worth minimal profit, in an industry that offers 
little new business opportunities.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific 
percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would 
engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in 
unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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R. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high personal gain , such as meeting a required GPA to 
maintain your scholarship.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific 
percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in 
school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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S. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in high personal gain.  Given that the chances of being caught and 
penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE 
STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate 
probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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T. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal personal gain, such as getting an “A” on a quiz 
that does not alter (up or down) your grade in the class.  Given that the chances of being caught and 
penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in
unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical 
behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ch
an
ce
s 
o
f b
ei
n
g 
ca
u
gh
t a
n
d 
pe
n
al
iz
ed
11. 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
87
U. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal personal gain, such as getting an “A” on a quiz that 
does not alter (up or down) the student’s grade in the class.  Given that the chances of being caught and 
penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE 
STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate 
probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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V. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high personal gain, such as securing a high dollar 
contract which would result in a large commission for you, as well as making certain that you would 
receive that promotion you have been seeking.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are 
some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical 
behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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W. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE PERSON.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in high personal gain, such as securing a high dollar contract 
which would result in a large commission for the employee, as well as making certain that s/he would 
receive that promotion s/he has been seeking.  Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are 
some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS 
PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate 
probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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X. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal personal gain, such as having the organization pay for 
lunch when it is not really a business luncheon (or falsification of an expense report).  Given that the 
chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability 
that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate 
probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Y. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.
Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal personal gain, such as having the organization pay for 
lunch when it is not really a business luncheon (or other falsification of an expense report).  Given that the 
chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability 
that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? 
(Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)
Probability of engaging in the behavior
1. 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. 30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
5. 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. 50% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. 70% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. 90% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Z. Cheating in school occurs for a number of reasons. Evaluate the following motivations to cheat in 
school based on following scale:
1. Contributes very little to cheating
2. Contributes little to cheating
3. Contributes an average amount to cheating
4. Contributes a great amount to cheating
5. Contributes a very great amount to cheating
_______ College of Business Administration requires a minimum GPA to stay in school.
_______ Top employers give more consideration to people with higher GPAs.
_______ Top Graduate Schools give greater consideration to people with higher GPAs.
_______ Parents pressure their children to raise grades.
_______ Peer pressure makes people cheat.
_______ Assistance from friends is easily available. 
_______ Students did not have the time to study properly.
_______ Student did not take the time to study properly.
_______ Professors assign too much work for students to do.
_______ Students enjoy too much work for student to do.
_______ Because everyone else cheats, “honest” students have to cheat to stay ahead of the curve.
_______ Student do not identify with the university and therefore feel no responsibility toward it or its code 
of conduct. 
_______ Professors do not care about teaching, so students do not care about learning.
_______ It is easy to cheat.
_______ Certain students just got in the habit of cheating in high school and continue it in college.
_______ People are just dishonest.
AB. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:
1. I agree very little
2. I agree little
3. I agree an average amount
4. I agree a great amount
5. I agree a very great amount
_______ Professors expect me to engage in unethical behavior.
_______ Professors expect the average student to engage in unethical behavior.
_______ The average business person is expected to engage in unethical behavior.
90
________I will be expected to engage in unethical behavior in business. 
________ People are unethical by their nature.
________ I will behave in an unethical manner because there is an expectation for me to behave in that 
manner.
________ The media creates the expectation that people will engage in unethical behavior.
________ The media creates the expectation that people will engage in ethical behavior.
________ When I have behaved unethically, it was because of the situation I was in.
________ When I have behaved unethically, it was because of the type of person I am.
________ When I have behave unethically, it was because othes expected me to, so I might as well.
AC. Answer the following questions based on the scale:
1. A very little amount
2. A little amount
3. An average amount
4. A great amount
5. A very great amount
________ To what extent have you cheated in your college career?
________ To what extent has the average student cheated in his/her college career?
________ To what extent does the average business person engage in unethical behavior at work?
AD. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:
1.    I agree very little
2. I agree little
3. I agree an average amount
4. I agree a great amount
5. I agree a very great amount
________ I describe myself as honest and ethical.
________ I describe myself as dishonest and unethical.
AE. Circle “Y” if you agree with the following statement and “N” if you do not.
Overall, I consider myself an honest and ethical person. Y N
My actions demonstrate to others that I am an honest and ethical person. Y N
My friends would describe me as an honest and ethical person. Y N
From my perspective, most people are honest and ethical. Y N
From my perspective, my friends are honest and ethical. Y N
From my perspective, most people are not honest and ethical. Y N
From my perspective, my friends are not honest and ethical. Y N
